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Digital services are increasingly important in the economy 
and in society in general, as they continue to shift from 
being a specifi c sector of activities to becoming the basis 
for the provision of most services. They offer multiple new 
opportunities from which consumers benefi t daily, but 
they also raise novel questions for consumer protection. 
This short policy piece, which is based on a policy report 
for the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE), propos-
es a policy agenda to improve EU consumer protection 
rules for digital services.1
The paper begins with a description of the principles on 
which smart consumer protection should be based. The 
following section offers proposals to improve the horizon-
tal consumer protection rules which apply to all services, 
both digital and non-digital. This is followed by propos-
als to strengthen the enforcement of those rules. The fi -
nal section suggests that if the horizontal rules were im-
proved and better enforced, most of the digital-specifi c 
consumer protection rules could be removed.
Principles for smart consumer protection
The best guardians of consumers’ interest are the con-
sumers themselves. That is why the main role of con-
sumer policy is to empower consumers to make the right 
* This paper is based on a policy report written with Anne-Lise Sibony 
of the University of Louvain, Belgium.
1 This paper focuses mainly on four main EU consumer protection laws: 
Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, OJ L 95/29; Directive 2005/29 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market, OJ L 149/22; 
Directive 2011/83 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2011 on consumer rights, OJ L 304/64; and Regulation 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Oc-
tober 2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible 
for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (the Regulation on 
consumer protection cooperation). Digital services are understood 
broadly and cover the main current legal categories, i.e. the informa-
tion society services, the provision of digital content, the electronic 
communications services and the audio-visual media services.
choices for themselves, in particular by ensuring that they 
have the right information and the possibility to switch 
when needed. However, the most basic dimension of this 
empowerment is to ensure that consumers understand 
the services they are using and the conditions of their pro-
visions. This may be complex – notably for older citizens 
– for digital services which are new and which evolve very 
quickly. That is why consumer education with regard to 
digital technologies in order to increase digital literacy is 
key to a smart consumer protection policy and is a pre-
requisite for the effectiveness of any consumer protection 
rule.
Good rule-making in general
Good consumer protection rules should abide by the 
general principles of good rule-making, as put forward in 
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge.2
Proportionality: Proportionality is a general principle of 
EU law requiring that public intervention does not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve its objectives.3 Proportion-
ality implies that horizontal rules should be as non-dis-
tortive as possible to achieve the protection of consum-
ers, and that the need for specifi c legislation is assessed 
against the background of existing horizontal legislation. 
Therefore, specifi c consumer protection rules for digital 
services should only be adopted when there is a clearly 
identifi ed market failure that cannot be remedied by these 
horizontal rules. Proportionality should also be respected 
by the consumer protection authorities when they im-
plement the rules. Before intervening, authorities should 
identify the consumer harm and demonstrate how their 
interventions help to remedy such harm.
Self- and co-regulation: A specifi c application of the 
principle of proportionality is the reliance on self- or co-
regulation when this mode of regulation can effectively 
protect consumers and strike the right balance between 
predictability, fl exibility and effi ciency. To do so, the con-
ception and the implementation of self- and co-regulation 
should follow the best practices principles adopted by the 
2 R. B a l d w i n , M. C a v e , M. L o d g e : Understanding Regulation: The-
ory, Strategy and Practice, 2nd ed., Oxford 2012, Oxford University 
Press.
3 European Commission: Better Regulation Guidelines, Commission 
Staff Working Document, SWD(2015) 111 fi nal, Strasbourg 2015.
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European Commission: rules should be prepared by par-
ticipants representing as many interests as possible, in an 
open manner, in good faith and with clear objectives, and 
the implementation of the rules should be monitored and 
regularly assessed.4 Currently, self- and co-regulation is 
used extensively to address some problems raised by 
rapidly developing digital services.5
Legal certainty and predictability: Rules should give suf-
fi cient certainty and predictability to suppliers as well as 
to consumers. This implies that the rules need to make 
up a coherent set, in particular with regard to the balance 
between horizontal and sector-specifi c rules, and must 
be simple to understand and suffi ciently stable over time, 
especially when the investment cycle is long.
Sustainability in the face of rapid and unpredictable tech-
nology and market evolution: The evolution of digital tech-
nology and the digital market is often rapid and unpre-
dictable. In this context, consumer protection rules need 
to be fl exible enough to adapt to these changes and to 
continuously meet their objectives. This is best achieved 
with rules which, on the one hand, have a horizontal 
scope of application and are not dependent on the type of 
services and, on the other hand, are principle-based and 
not overly specifi c or detailed.
Non-discrimination, level playing fi eld and technological 
neutrality: A basic non-discrimination principle, also re-
ferred to as a regulatory “level playing fi eld”, implies that 
all substitutable services are subject to the same rules.6
Two more recent principles
Next to the well-established principles for good govern-
ance, smart consumer protection rules also need to be 
based on two additional principles which have been more 
recently established by the academic research.
4 European Commission: Principles for Better Self- and Co-Regulation, 
February 2013, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-mar-
ket/sites/digital-agenda/files/CoP%20-%20Principles%20for%20
better%20self-%20and%20co-regulation.pdf.
5 See the Memorandum of Understanding on the sale of counterfeit 
goods via the Internet, which was revised in June 2016; the Code of 
Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, adopted in May 
2016; and the Key principles for comparison tools, agreed in 2016, 
which fed into the Commission Guidance of June 2016 on the imple-
mentation/application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.
6 A stronger technological neutrality principle implies that legislation 
and regulation are sustainable in the face of technological evolution, 
that competition should not be distorted by regulation and that regu-
lators should not try to “pick technology winners” when intervening in 
the markets.
Taking consumer biases into account: Many current con-
sumer protection rules assume that consumers are ra-
tional and always act in their best interest given the in-
formation at their disposal. However, behavioural studies 
(well summarised in Thaler and Sunstein as well as by 
Kahneman) have shown that consumers suffer from many 
biases and that their rationality is bounded.7 In particu-
lar, they suffer from inertia (laziness in switching), short-
sightedness (hyperbolic discounting) and innumeracy 
(diffi culty in understanding numbers). To be more effec-
tive, consumer protection rules need to take these biases 
into account.8
Personalisation: Consumers of digital services are heter-
ogeneous in capabilities and preferences. This diversity 
is well understood by big data fi rms whose business is 
to identify the characteristics of each customer in order 
to target the users and tailor their services accordingly.9 
Consumer diversity can also be better taken into account 
in the rule-making and enforcement processes,10 provid-
ed some safeguards are in place, such that the person-
alisation should be based on objective and transparent 
criteria and that privacy is respected.
Better horizontal consumer protection rules
The cornerstone of EU consumer protection rules is the 
disclosure of as much information as possible to allow 
consumers to make the best choices for themselves. This 
transparency obligation is complemented by fairness ob-
ligations. Both types of obligations can be made smarter 
when applying the principles explained above.
Information disclosure
Current disclosure rules are not adapted to rationality-
bounded consumers,11 as they do not suffi ciently take 
into account what type of information should be given, 
7 R. T h a l e r, C. S u n s t e i n : Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven 2008, Yale University Press; 
and D. K a h n e m a n : Thinking Fast and Slow, New York 2011, Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux.
8 G. H e l l e r i n g e r, A.-L. S i b o n y : European Consumer Protection 
Through the Behavioural Lens, in: Columbia Journal of European Law, 
Vol. 23, No. 3, 2017, pp. 607-646.
9 V. M a y e r- S c h ö n b e rg e r, K. C u k i e r : Big Data: A Revolution that 
will transform how we live, work and think, New York 2013, Eamon 
Dolan/Mariner Books.
10 This was also suggested by A. P o r a t , L.J. S t r a h i l e v i t z : Personal-
izing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, in: Michigan Law 
Review, Vol. 112, No. 8, 2014, pp. 1417-1478.
11 O. B a r- G i l l , O. B e n - S h a h a r : Regulatory Techniques in Consumer 
Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law, in: Com-
mon Market Law Review, Vol. 50, pp. 109-126; and Norwegian Con-
sumer Protection Agency: APPFAIL: Threats to Consumers in Mobile 
Apps, March 2016.
Intereconomics 2017 | 4
228
Forum
at what time and in which format. Moreover, they are not 
adapted to algorithmic consumers, i.e. consumers using 
digital personal assistants – such as Apple’s Siri or Am-
azon’s Alexa – to help them make their choices or even 
to conclude their purchases for them.12 Thus, disclosure 
rules should be improved to promote smarter disclosures 
to humans and to bots.
Disclosure to humans: The disclosure of information to hu-
mans should comply with the EAST framework proposed 
by the UK Behavioural Insight Team, i.e. they should be 
easy, attractive, social and timely.13 In particular, the in-
formation given should fi rst of all focus on what really 
matters to consumers; such information could possibly 
be personalised depending on individual capabilities and 
preferences. Second, the information should be present-
ed in a user-friendly manner, for instance relying on differ-
ent layers of information and using intelligible language. 
Third, it should be given when the decision needs to be 
made – and not too much beforehand.14
Disclosure to bots: Digital personal assistants can pro-
cess much more information than humans, and hence 
there is less risk of information overload. However, the in-
formation needs to be given in machine-readable formats 
and always before the decision is taken by the consumer 
(or directly by the digital personal assistant).
Fairness obligation
Next to information disclosure, the EU consumer protec-
tion rules prohibit unfair practices, i.e. practices which 
are not in good faith15 or which contravene professional 
12 M.S. G a l : Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice, 20 May 
2017, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2971456.
13 The Behavioural Insights Team: EAST: Four Simple Ways to Apply Be-
havioural Insights, April 2014.
14 A good practice was Article 14 of the regulation on roaming charg-
es, which stipulated that the costs of roaming charges needed to be 
disclosed when the customer was crossing a border and not only in 
Terms and Conditions that few customer read; see European Union: 
Regulation 531/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 June 2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks 
within the Union, Article 14, OJ L 172/28, 30 June 2012.
15 According to Article 3(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, a con-
tract term which has not been individually negotiated is unfair if, con-
trary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a signifi cant imbal-
ance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, 
to the detriment of the consumer. See European Council: Council 
Directive 93/ 13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer con-
tracts, OJ L 95/29, 21 April 1993.
diligence.16 The advantage of these principle-based rules 
is that they can easily adapt to the rapid and often unpre-
dictable evolution in the provision of digital services. The 
drawback, however, is that they can raise legal uncertain-
ty as to whether a specifi c practice is prohibited.
To increase legal certainty, which is benefi cial to both pro-
viders and consumers of digital services, national con-
sumer protection authorities and the European Commis-
sion should establish a structured dialogue with all of the 
stakeholders. This dialogue should be used to determine 
which practices should be considered unfair. These prac-
tices should then be listed in guidance instruments that 
should be updated and revised as technology and market 
evolve.17
Better enforcement of the rules
It is not enough to have smarter rules; they need to be 
well enforced to be effective. As recently shown by the 
European Commission,18 the main problem with consum-
er protection in Europe is not the design of the rules but 
their enforcement. Therefore, the two current avenues for 
enforcement – public and private – need to be strength-
ened, and a third avenue based on technology needs to 
be explored.
Public enforcement
To strengthen public enforcement, national consumer 
protection agencies need to be well staffed, independent 
of any political pressure or capture by corporate interests 
or consumer associations, and granted the power to im-
pose sanctions with suffi cient deterrent effects. National 
16 According to Article 5(2) of the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive, 
a commercial practice is unfair when it (i) is contrary to the require-
ments of professional diligence, and (ii) materially distorts or is likely 
to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the prod-
uct of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is ad-
dressed, or of the average member of the group when a commercial 
practice is directed to a particular group of consumers. In particular a 
commercial practice is unfair when it is misleading (hence the trans-
parency in a broad sense is not achieved) or aggressive. See Euro-
pean Union: Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council 
Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive’), OJ L 149/22, 11 June 2005.
17 This is what the European Commission has done with the revision in 
June 2016 of the Guidance on the implementation/application of the 
Unfair Commercial Practice Directive and what the Commission in-
tends to do with the adoption of Guidance on the implementation of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.
18 European Commission: Commission Fitness Check Report on EU 
consumer and marketing rules, SWD(2017) 209, Brussels 2017.
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authorities should also seize the opportunities offered by 
digital technology, in particular big data and artifi cial intel-
ligence, to improve their operations.
Moreover, consumer protection agencies should cooper-
ate more intensively at the national level with other agen-
cies responsible for regulating specifi c aspects of the 
digital value chain (such as authorities in charge of data 
protection, competition policy, electronic communication 
or media services) to achieve better and more consist-
ent decisions across the value chain. National consumer 
protection agencies in the member states should also 
cooperate more closely among themselves and with the 
Commission to establish more consistent interpretations 
of rules, develop best practices and better fi ght against 
pan-EU infringements of EU consumer rules.19
Private enforcement
Centralised and public enforcement is inevitably limited, 
as public fi nancing and public information are limited, 
even when the authorities use the full potential of big data 
and artifi cial intelligence. Therefore, it should be comple-
mented by an active decentralised and private enforce-
ment. The current EU consumer protection rules already 
stimulate private enforcement by giving several means 
of action to consumers when their rights have been in-
fringed. First, they can take an action before an adminis-
trative authority or a court and act individually or, in some 
cases, collectively, in order to get injunctions and dam-
ages. Second, they can request mediation, in particular 
via the European Consumer Centres for cross-border 
cases or via out-of-court dispute resolution. Third, they 
can lodge a complaint with the national consumer protec-
tion agencies.
However, any of those actions requires that consumers 
must be aware of their rights and of the possible viola-
tion they have suffered, which is often not the case.20 
Therefore, the Commission must establish a consumer 
law database and run awareness-raising campaigns. 
Some available remedies, such as injunctions, could be 
expanded to cover more parts of consumer legislation. 
Also, the conditions to receive damages in case of con-
sumer rights infringements could be further harmonised 
19 Since 2007 national consumer protection agencies run an annual “EU 
sweep”, which is an EU-wide screening of websites to check their 
compliance with EU consumer protection rules: on airlines (2007), 
mobile content (2008), electronic goods (2009), online tickets for cul-
tural and sports events (2010), consumer credit (2011), digital content 
(2012), travel services (2013), guarantees on electronic goods (2014), 
Consumer Rights Directive (2015), and online holidays booking (2016).
20 European Commission: Commission Fitness… , op. cit.
and facilitated, as was done in 2014 for competition law 
infringements.21
Technology enforcement
An alternative means of enforcement, promoted by 
Lessig,22 consists in moving the rules from the legislative 
code to computer code. This will now be imposed be-
ginning in 2018 by the General Data Protection Regula-
tion, with a new privacy by design obligation.23 A similar 
obligation of “consumer protection by design” could be 
envisaged. For instance, an obligation to personalise in-
formation disclosure could be written in the code of the 
algorithm. Obviously, this is a new avenue for regulation 
that should be further explored in negotiations among au-
thorities, digital fi rms and consumer associations.
Horizontalisation of the digital-specifi c consumer 
protection rules
As the economy becomes more digitalised, digital servic-
es no longer constitute (vertical) sectors of the economy 
but rather its very (horizontal) foundation. Hence, most 
digital-specifi c consumer protection rules should either 
be transferred into the horizontal rules or removed. Only 
where there is a public interest specifi c to digital servic-
es which cannot be covered by horizontal rules should a 
sector rule be maintained.
Furthermore, the rules that are maintained should meet 
the principle of non-discrimination and be the same for all 
services considered as substitutable by the consumers. 
In that regard, the increasing substitution between, on the 
one hand, traditional telecommunications and media ser-
vices and, on the other hand, new communications and 
media over-the-top services,24 should lead to an increas-
ing convergence between the rules applied to those two 
categories of digital providers. 
21 Directive 2014/104 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions 
of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349/1, 5 De-
cember 2014.
22 L. L e s s i g : Code and Other Laws of the Cyberspace – Version 2.0, 
New York 2006, Basic Books.
23 Article 25 of Regulation 679/2016 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with re-
gard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119/1, 4 May 
2016.
24 Ecorys and TNO: Study on future trends and business models in com-
munication services, Study for the European Commission, 2016.
